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Noncompliance behaviour of Iranian fishers with the fisheries regulations in the 
Persian Gulf is examined in this study. A formal theoretical model and analytical 
framework that was useful in the understanding of compliance behaviour of 
individuals with fisheries regulations are developed. By using a standard 
questionnaire and a stratified random sampling method, a total of 566 fishermen 
from three Iranian provinces located on the coast of the Persian Gulf were 
interviewed. The factors include deterrence, moral, social influences and legitimacy 
variables that can explain the observed noncompliance with zoning regulation for 
shrimp fishery were examined. A Probit and Logit econometric techniques· were 
used to estimate the violation decision by Iranian fishermen in the study area while 
the Tobit model was used to estimate the total number of fishing days in Shrimp 
Fishing Zone (SFZ). The model was classified into two types: the basic and the 
extended model. In general, the Probit estimation technique perfonns better than the 
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Tobit technique. The Probit model exogenous probability variables however gives 
better results than the Probit model using raw probabilities. 
The results indicated that deterrence, moral, and legitimacy factors detennined the 
violation decision of individual fishers to fish in the prohibited zone. The social 
influence factor (PERTVIOL) was only significant in the Bushehr province. The 
results also indicate that the deterrence variables, moral development, and 
legitimacy factor are more important than the social influence factor in explaining 
the compliance behaviour in the study area. 
From the economic perspective, moral development and legitimacy variables can 
complement the efficiency goal in any enforcement program by reducing the need 
for large expenditures on enforcement inputs to secure compliance. The results 
showed that using exogenous variables directly in the extended model to explain the 
violation decision in the individual provinces provide a good result for provinces of 
Khuzestan and Busbehr. The number of Fishing days (DAY) appears to play a very 
important role in explaining the violation decision of fishennen in the Khuzestan 
and Busbehr provinces. The other important variables are the horsepower of 
fishermen boats (POWER), the morality variable (MeODE), and number of times 
that fishermen have seen the enforcement personnel at the sea (FBOATNO). The 
legitimacy variables also have considerable role in explaining compliance behaviour 
in the cases of Khuzestan and Busbehr provinces. 
Although the overall probability of detection and conviction (OVEPROB) variable 
was significant with an unexpected sign, the exogenous variables of probability of 
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detection and conviction came out significant in most the regressions runs with 
expected signs. It cannot be denied that it plays a very important role than the other 
(such as moral obligation and legitimacy) variables in securing compliance. Thus, 
enforcement resources should be utilized together with positive reinforcement of the 
normative variables. Nevertheless, enforcement inputs wi)) have a deterrence effect 
on the violators and other fishermen thus reducing the overall violation rate. The 
capacity of enforcement resources in the Persian Gulf area is limited. There is need 
to reestablish the enforcement institutions and resources. The government should 
therefore pay attention to enhancing enforcement resources in the area of study to 
deter violators. 
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Sikap ketidakpatuhan nelayan-nelayan Iran terhadap peraturan-peraturan perikanan 
di Teluk Parsi diteliti dalam kajian ini. Satu model teoritikal formal dan rangka 
ana1itikal yang berfaedah untuk memahami sikap kepatuban individu kepada 
peraturan-peraturan perikanan dibentuk.. Dmgan menggunakan soal-selidik piawai 
dan kaedah pe� strata, s�mnlah 566 nelayan daripada 3 buah wilayah di 
Iran yang terletak di perairan Teluk Parsi telah ditemlbual. Faktor-faktor meliputi 
pencegahan, moral, pengaruh sosial dan pembolehubah perundangan yang mampu 
menerangkan ketidakpatuhan kepada peraturan zon perikanan udang telah dikaji. 
Satu teknik ekonometrik Probit dan Logit telah digunakan untuk mengganggarkan 
keputusan pelanggaran undang-undang oleh nelayan-nelayan Iran di kawasan kajian 
manakala model Tobit telah digunakan untuk menaksir jumlah bilangan hari 
perilcanan kawasan perikanan udang (SFZ). Model dikeJaskan kepada dua jenis: 
model asas dan model laqjutan. Umumnya, teknik penaksiran Probit adalah lebih 
baik daripada teknik Tobit. Model Probit yang menggunakan pembolehubah 
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kebarangkalian eksogen walau bagaimanapm memberikan keputusan yang lebih 
baik daripada model probit yang menggunakan kebarangkaJian mentah. 
Keputusan menmjukkan bahawa pencegahan, moral dan faktor-faktor permdangan 
menentukan keputusan pelanggaran mdang-mdang inelividu mtuk menangkap ikan 
di kawasan larangan. Faktor pengaruh sosial (PERTIVOL) hanya bererti di wilayah 
Bushehr. Keputuan juga menmjukkan bahawa pembolehubah pencegahan, 
pembangunan moral, dan faktor perundangan adalah lebih penting daripada faktor 
pengaruh sosial dalam menerangkan sikap kepatuhan eli kawasan kajian. 
Daripada perspektif ekonomi, pembangman moral dan faktor perundangan mampu 
melengkapi matlarnat kecekapan dalam mana-mana program penguatkuasaan 
dengan mengurangkan keperluan kepada perbelanjaan yang besar untuk input-input 
pelaksanaan bagi memastikan kepatuhan. Keputusan menunjukkan bahawa 
penggmaan pembolehubah eksogen secara langsung dalam model lanjutan bagi 
menerangkan keputusan pelanggaran mdang-undang eli wilayah yang dikaji 
memberikan keputusan yang baik bagi wilayah Khuzestan dan Bushehr. Bilangan 
hari perikanan (DAY) memainkan peranan yang penting dalam menerangkan 
keputusan pelanggaran tmdang-undang oleh nelayan eli wilayah Khuzestan dan 
Bushehr. Pembolehubah penting yang lain ialah kuasa kuda bot nelayan (POWER), 
pembolehubah moral (MeODE), dan kekerapan nelayan melihat pegawai 
penguatkuasa di laut (FBOATNO). Faktor perundangan juga mempunyai peranan 
yang besar dalam menerangkan sikap kepatuhan hagi wi1ayah Khuz.estan dan 
Bushehr. 
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Walaupun &ktor kebarangkalian penemuan dan penyabitan kesalahan keseluruhan 
(OVEPROB) adalah bererti dengan tanda tidak dijangka, faktor eksogen 
kebarangkalian penemuan dan penyabitan kesalahan adalah bererti dalam hampir 
senma analisis regresi dengan tanda yang dijangka Tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa 
ianya memainkan peranan yang amat penting daripada pembolehubah lain (seperti 
tanggungjawab moral dan penmdangan) dalam memastikan kepatuhan. 
Oleh itu, sumber-sumber penguatkuasaan perlu digunakan secara bersama dengan 
pengukuhan positif bagi pembolehubah-pembolehubah normatif Walau 
bagaimanapun sumber-sumber penguatkuasaan akan merq>unyai kesan pencegahan 
kepada mereka yang melanggar undang-undang dan nelayan-nelayan lain seterusnya 
mengurangkan kadar pelanggaran undang-undang. Keupayaan sumber-sumber 
penguatkuasaan di Teluk Parsi adalah terbatas. Terdapat keperluan untuk 
menubuhkan semula institusi penguatkuasaan dan sumber-sumber. Oleh itu, 
kerajaan sepatutnya memberikan perhatian untuk menambahkan sumber-sumber 
penguatkuasaan di kawasan kajian untuk mencegah mereka yang melanggar undang­
undang. 
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CHAPTER! 
INTRODUCTION 
Iran is a large country in  West Asia covering a total area of 1648000 km2 with a 
strategic regional role i n  the Middle East. The total population was about 66 million  
i n  1998 with a growth rate of 2 percent per annum. There are 28 provinces i n  Iran, 
seven of which are in  the coastal areas. Three coastal provinces are i n  the north on  
the coast of Caspian Sea and four of them lies in  the southern part of Iran on the 
coast of the Persian Gulf and Sea of Oman. Iran has a coastli ne of 2900 km, of 
which, 1950 km is i n  the south and about 900 km is i n  the north on the coast of 
Caspi an Sea. 
1.1 National Economy of Iran 
S ince 1987, Iran has undergone a process of economic transition, changing from a 
govemment-controll ed economy towards a more l iberal and market-orien ted 
economic structure. The main development resulting from the recent policies had 
been the privatization of many government economic activiti es. Key factors 
contributing to the government's decision - maki ng have been the enormous 
popul ation growth, as well as the attempt to optimi ze  the management of the 
econom y by pri vatization (Abzigostar. 1996). According to Iranian consti tution, the 
economy consists of three sectors: The public sector, the cooperatives, and the 
private sector. However developments in the economy after the revolution (1979) 
favored an immense growth of the public sector. Since 1989 when the first five-year 
development plan began the tendency has been to unload some of the 
responsibilities from the public sector into the other two. 
Another key social development factor has been the rapid urbanization, job 
opportunities, living standards, and better facilities in urban area. This pattern has 
placed a strong emphasis, in policy terms and on greater sharing of the nation's 
wealth through the promotion of regional development, including those 
communities particularly dependent on fishing (Abzigostar, 1996). 
1.1.1 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross National Product (GNP) 
An indication of the economic importance of fishing in a national level can be 
shown by its share in the GNP (Coull, 1993). GNP is defined as the total market 
value of all goods and services produced in the nation's economy in one year 
(Edgmand, 1983). GDP is the main macroeconomic variable, and defines the total 
market value internally by the nation and by foreigners who work or invest in the 
country (Blanchard, 2000). In Iran, there is a little difference between GOP and 
GNP, indicating relative unimportance of external earnings (Table 1.1). 
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Table 1.1: Major Economic Groups in GDP (billion Rials constant 1982 price). 
Year 1980 1985 1989 
GNP 9560 12058 9797 
GDP 9556 12072 9782 
Share of Agriculture in GDP (%) 20 21 28 
Share of Manufacturing in GDP (%) 10 10 14 
Share of Oil in GDP (%) 9 14 19 
Others (%) 60.8 51 39 
Source: SCI, 1985- 1996. Note: USS1 = 7910 Rials. 
1992 1994 
12986 13582 
12879 13181 
26 28 
16 16 
20 19 
38 37 
Table 1.1 shows that the Iranian economy is heavily dependent on oil, accounting 
for 19 percent ofGDP in 1994. However, the economy is gradually diversifying with 
a rising share of other main groups such as agriculture and manufacturing. Table 1.1 
also shows that the agriculture sector is the most important contributor to the 
economy, varying from 20 percent of GDP in 1980 to 28 percent in 1994. 
1.1.2 Employment 
The total population of the country was some 53 million in 1988, rising in 1998 to 
around 65.7 million people with a growth rate of around 2.8 percent per annum . 
However, the population is not evenly distributed throughout the country. About 
57% lives in the large urban centers, and the remaining 43% of the population are 
rural inhabitants, distributed throughout the 28 provinces. These range from the 
most densely populated provinces around the Caspian Sea (in the north) and western 
3 
